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1 Introduction
Following the seminal work of Cole and Ohanian (1999), recent studies have
started to apply general equilibrium analysis to the Great Depression of the
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11930s.1 The aim of this stream of research is to deepen our historical knowl-
edge of the period, by putting the quantitative tools provided by modern
macroeconomics at the service of historic analysis.2
This paper follows the tradition of this literature, casting the Great De-
pression in Belgium within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
framework. A typical aspect of this literature is its focus on a purely national
dimension. Among all the papers interpreting the Great Depression by means
of a DSGE model, only two - Cole, Ohanian, and Leung (2005) and Perri
and Quadrini (2002) - have taken a worldwide perspective. Even studies
concerning notoriously open economies such as France (Beaudry and Portier
(2002)), Germany (Fisher and Hornstein (2002)) and the United Kingdom
(Cole and Ohanian (2002)) took a closed-economy perspective. If, a priori,
such a stance appears unwarranted, it is nonetheless true that these analy-
ses still delivered useful insights, while keeping the models relatively simple.
On this ground, although the closed-economy assumption may be di±cult
to retain for Belgium, it is useful to proceed stepwise for analytical con-
venience: ¯rst a closed-economy analysis, and then the exploration of the
open-economy issues. This paper deals mainly with the former, leaving the
open-economy analysis for future research. However, a brief detour into the
open-economy ¯eld is provided in the last section as a robustness check.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I look at selected data
on interwar Belgium. Section 3 provides some basic facts about the Bel-
gian interwar history. In Section 4, I detrend the data so as to make them
compatible with the theory. Section 5 derives and simulates a basic real
business cycle (RBC) model with productivity shocks, to account for the
Great Depression in Belgium. Section 6 extends the analysis by introducing
war expectations in the baseline model. Results suggest that, in a perfect-
competition, °exible-price framework, the contribution of both productivity
shocks and war expectations for explaining the depression is slim. Therefore,
in Section 7, I consider a simple DSGE model with nominal wage stickiness
and monetary shocks. Results show that the introduction of nominal wage
staggering and monetary shocks improves the results, with the model able to
account for all the observed drop in detrended output, consumption, invest-
ments and labour input. The sluggishness of the recovery, however, remains
largely unexplained. The role of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks in
this new environment is also explored. Its contribution is again found to
1Major contributions in this ¯eld are Cole and Ohanian (2004), Christiano, Motto, and
Rostagno (2004), Kehoe and Prescott (2002), Prescott (1999) and Weder (2006), to name
but a few. Pensieroso (2007) provides a critical survey of this literature.
2On the clash between economic history and new classical macroeconomics over the
Great Depression, see De Vroey and Pensieroso (2006).
2be minor. Section 8 removes the closed-economy assumption from the ba-
sic RBC model. Although this framework is admittedly oversimpli¯ed, its
results are almost identical with those for the closed-economy. This ¯nd-
ing suggests that, in the perfect-competition, °exible-price RBC model at
least, the tiny additional explanatory power gained by considering an open-
economy model is not worth the price of having an analytically less tractable
model. Finally, Section 9 draws some conclusions, and provides guidelines
for future research.
2 A look at the Data
In this section I will present selected data on the Belgian interwar economy.
The appendix describes the sources and derivation of the data in detail.
Figure 1 shows real data on output and its components. GNP (Y ) growth
witnessed two accelerations, in 1922-24 and 1928-30. The Great Depression
hit Belgium in 1931, later than in most other countries. Output decreased
until 1934, recovered until 1937, then decreased again. Consumption followed
a comparable but slightly smoother pattern. Figure 2 shows investments (I),
imports (M), exports (X) and public consumption (Gc) as percentages of
GNP. Investments as a percentage of GDP swing widely, with a marked
downward tendency: decreasing until 1926, increasing until 1929, then de-
creasing again. In 1939, investment comprised just 8.4% of GNP, compared
with a value of 19.7% in 1920. Exports as a percentage of GNP increased
sharply until 1928, then decreased until 1932, then increased again until 1937.
Imports as a percentage of GNP was basically increased until 1931, and then
again from 1932 to 1937, but saw two big drops in 1932 and 1938. It is worth
highlighting that the percentages of exports and imports are relatively high,
reaching a level as high as 30% of GNP. Trade balance (i.e. exports minus
imports) was in de¯cit during all the 1920s except 1926-1928, and was in
de¯cit again in 1929-1935. However there was then a moderate surplus until
the end of the decade. Public consumption's share of GNP decreased slightly
until 1927, and increased slightly afterwards. As shown in Figure 3, private
consumption increased sharply as a percentage of GNP from 1920 to 1922,
but to decreased steadily thereafter until 1929. It then went up again until
1932, and later swing up and down with a slightly decreasing trend.
Figure 4 gives monthly data on real interest rates (r) and unemployment
rates (u). Real interest rates were positive and high in the early 1920s and
then in the midst of the depression years. They were low and even negative
in the mid-twenties and in 1936-37. As for unemployment, Belgium seems
to have experienced a full employment in the 1920s, apart from 1920-21,
3when recovery from the war had not yet been fully attained. After 1930,
unemployment rapidly gained momentum. It reached a peak of 28% in 1935,
followed by a mild and slow recovery, to worsen again in 1938-39.
Figure 5 shows 1930-based indices of real and monetary wages. Monetary
wages sharply increased during all the 1920s, to reach a peak in 1930. Then
they decreased during the depression, reaching a trough in 1935, when they
had decreased cumulatively by a good 24 %. Thereafter, they increased again
until the outbreak of the war. Real wages followed a di®erent pattern. They
were almost constant and then slightly decreasing up to 1927, but increased
appreciably thereafter. In the midst of the depression, real wages remained
approximately constant, at slightly above their 1930 value. After 1935, they
increased again until 1939.
Figure 6 shows the monthly retail price index, as well as its monthly rate
of variation. Belgium witnessed an appreciable de°ation in 1920-21, followed
by period of steep increases in the price index up to 1925. After mid-1926,
prices shot up, possibly as a consequence of the monetary stabilisation carried
out in that year. Thereafter, in°ation follows the same path as in 1923-26,
until 1930. As the Great Depression hit Belgium, the sharp de°ation typically
associated with it followed. De°ation endured up to 1935, the year of the
devaluation of the Belgian franc.
To better appreciate the possible role of monetary variables, Figure 7
shows data for the nominal money supply (M1), together with the annual
price index (P). From this graph we see that money supply increased until
1931, then decrease sharply until 1934, then increased again. The behaviour
of the real money supply can be deduced by comparing the nominal money
supply index with the price index. The exercise shows that, as far as the
Great Depression is concerned, the real quantity of money decreased in 1932,
in 1934 and in 1937, as in those years the nominal quantity of money dropped
more than the price level.
Figure 8 gives the data on nominal exchange rates between the Belgian
franc and the British, American and French currencies. The Belgian franc
depreciated against the pound from 1919 to 1927. It then stayed constant
four years, to appreciate again from 1931 to 1934. Thereafter it depreciated
again until 1936. The exchange rate between the Belgian franc and the dollar
followed a similar though less accentuated path. In this case, the appreciation
of the franc in the 1930s started later, in 1933. Finally, the Belgian franc
depreciated against the French franc from 1919 to 1923, to appreciate until
1926. It fell sharply in 1927, depreciating by 40%, to stay constant until
1934, when it fell sharply again, followed in 1936 by a strong appreciation.
43 History of Interwar Belgium
In this section I shall brie°y outline the basic economic and political events
that shaped Belgium's interwar history.3
3.1 1920-1926
Unlike other European nations, Belgium had a low debt burden to cope
with after World War I. In fact, having experienced German occupation
throughout most of the war, Belgium had had no possibility of issuing internal
debt for war ¯nancing. This is why, initially, the Belgian economy skipped the
typical debt-driven post war hyperin°ation which hit other countries. The
1920-1926 period witnessed a marked post-war growth in an environment
characterised by in°ation, a °oating exchange rate, low unemployment rates
and steady real wages.
According to the historians, the division of the reconstruction burden
between labour and capital income was controversial, a trait that Belgium
shared with many other European countries immediately after the war. Much
like the French, the Belgians tried to avoid the problem by pretending to
believe that Germany would pay for the reconstruction of their economy, as
it was obliged to by the Versailles Treaty. By sticking to this conviction,
they produced big government de¯cits, ¯nancing both the reconstruction
and a new social legislation by issuing public-debt short run bonds. Actually
this de¯cit spending was concealed by the fact that, at that time, the Belgian
government kept two budgets, one, which was more and less always balanced,
for ordinary expenses, and another, whose liabilities were supposed to be paid
by the Germans, for extraordinary expenses. After the French invasion of
the Ruhr failed (1923), this double accounting trick did not work anymore.
Investors realised that Germany would never pay for Belgian reconstruction
and started to withdraw their money. The Belgian franc depreciated from
30 BF/$ in 1919 to 96 BF/$ in 1925. In°ation rose. If the exchange rate
were to be stabilised and the gold standard restored, new taxes had to be
raised, to control the public debt, thus restoring investors' trust. After a
¯rst failed attempt in 1925, the franc was ¯nally stabilised in 1926. The
new government was able to take draconian ¯scal measures, to restore the
budgetary balance, including the levying of new taxes on land and luxury
consumption, and the restructuring of the railway system. Under these new
3Sources are Baudhuin (1946), Cassiers (1989b), Cassiers (1995), Eichengreen (1992),
Goossens (1988), Goossens, Peeters, and Pepermans (1988), Hogg (1986), Mommen
(1994), and Vanthemsche (1987).
5conditions, an international loan was obtained, which allowed the National
Bank to stabilise the franc at the rate of 175 BF/$.
3.2 1926-1930
In the period between 1926 and 1930, the Belgian economy experienced high
growth rates. However, there is some evidence that such a growth was not
evenly distributed among sectors. In particular, the wholesale and the retail
price indices followed di®erent patterns, with retail prices increasing much
faster than wholesale prices. According to Cassiers (1995), this shows that
the price in francs of tradable goods stopped growing soon after the stabil-
isation of the franc, whereas domestic prices kept on increasing. This led
to a decline in pro¯tability in the export sector. This observation is rein-
forced by the fact that real wages grew by about 20% between 1927 and
1930. Notwithstanding this, unemployment rates were remarkably low until
the end of 1930.
Another feature of the period is the marked surge in banking and ¯nancial
activities. Prices on the stock exchange grew on average by 246% between
August 1926 and May 1928, apparently fueled by a generalized distrust of
public securities. Banks' liabilities increased by 50% between 1927 and 1930,
without a comparable increase in their capitalisation. After the stabilisation,
there was a heavy in°ow of gold, which induced the National Bank to adopt
sterilisation policies.
In synthesis, the 1926-1930 was a period of boom in the domestic and
¯nancial sectors, while pro¯tability in the export sector fell because of the
combination of decreasing output prices and increasing unit labour costs.
3.3 1930-1935
In 1931, the United Kingdom, one of Belgium's biggest commercial partners,
left the gold standard and devaluated the pound. The United Kingdom also
imposed trade restrictions on steel and other goods that hit Belgium heavily.
Belgian exporters reacted as price-takers typically do, i.e. by trying to sustain
losses rather than losing market share. The volume of exports therefore fell
much less than their value in Belgian francs.
When the United Kingdom left the gold standard, the Belgian authorities
implemented de°ationary policies in order to reduce the di®erential between
domestic and external prices. Income tax, indirect taxes and tari®s were all
increased. The real tax burden, which was 11.7% in 1930, jumped to 15.3%
in 1932 and 16.4% in 1934. Public expenditure on salaries, pensions and
unemployment bene¯ts were reduced. Nominal wages went down but not
6enough to prevent real wages increasing. The unemployment rate jumped
from 4% in 1930 to above 20% in 1932. The fragile bank system entered
a liquidity crisis soon after 1933. In 1934 the Banque Nationale Belge du
Travail declared solvency problems. The National Bank reduced the o±cial
discount rate so as to inject liquidity into the system. But this policy to save
the ¯nancial system went openly against gold standard rules, as big gold out-
°ows were being observed, to which the National Bank should have reacted
by increasing the discount rate. Investors started liquidating deposits, as
they anticipated a devaluation of the franc. This worsened the bank crisis
and made eventual devaluation unavoidable. After a year of political and
¯nancial turmoil, the Belgian government devaluate the franc by 28% on
April 1935. The amount was intended to regain competitive prices abroad,
while avoiding a competitive devaluation that could have caused commercial
retaliations from the United Kingdom.
3.4 1935-1939
Devaluation was followed by a big credit expansion, which permitted to a
recovery till 1937. Pressure on aggregate demand caused in°ation to gain
momentum. Yet capacity was apparently so under-utilised that in°ation re-
mained under control. Mutatis mutandis, the same was true for real wages,
which were kept under control, although they increased gradually. The Bel-
gian authorities, unlike their French counterparts, were initially able to resist
the 40-hours-a-week movement. Unemployment remained very high, com-
pared to 1930. Finally, currency devaluation notwithstanding, the trade
account did not improve. In facts, exports stagnated, whereas imports in-
creased, possibly due to the upsurge in aggregate demand. Strong capital
in°ows helped to keep the balance of payments favourable.
4 The Data through the Lens of the Theory
4.1 Detrending
According to RBC theory, business cycles are de¯ned as deviations from the
long run trend. This means that to be able to look at the Great Depression in
Belgium from a neoclassical perspective, I ¯rst need to remove the long-run
trend from the data.4 Following Cole and Ohanian (1999), I have assumed
4It is worth highlighting that detrending is hardly a neutral technique, in the sense
that by construction the choice of the trend value can in°uence the magnitude and even
the presence of cyclical oscillations.
7that the economy grows in the long-run as predicted by the simple Solow-
Ramsey framework, so that all per-capita variables grow at the same constant
rate, which is the exogenous growth rate of technology. Using data from
Comin and Hobijn (2004), I computed the average rate of growth of the
Belgian real GDP per capita in the period 1900-1994 (g), excluding World
Wars I and II, and the Great Depression (1929-1939) as well. It turned out
to be equal to 3.02%. This is assumed to be the long-run constant growth
rate. Next I collected data on the Belgian working-age population (i.e. the
15-65 demographic cluster) from the Belgian o±cial demographic statistics
(Ministere des A®aire Economiques (1943)) and I expressed GNP in per
capita terms (Y=N = y). Hence, I detrended the y series, taking 1929 as




where ° = 1 + g. The same procedure was followed for detrending all the
macroeconomic aggregates.
The results are shown in Figure 9. Output per capita dropped a good
20% after 1930, and remained at about this level, with a further decrease
in 1938-39. In line with Cole and Ohanian (1999)'s claim about the US
Great Depression, Belgium did not recover before the outbreak of world war
II. Investments per capita (i) constantly decreased, to reach the trough of
almost 64% below trend in 1939. Consumption per capita (c) was below
trend throughout the depression years, showing a slight downward trend.
4.2 Total Factor Productivity
Figure 9 also shows the detrended total factor productivity (TFP). TFP was






where the lowercase variables stand for per capita, k is capital and l hours
worked. Non-detrended TFP is given by estx
1¡®
t . Labour-augmenting tech-
nological progress is represented by x, whose growth at the rate g gives the
deterministic trend of the economy. es is the stochastic component of TFP,
i.e. its deviations from trend, and therefore what remains after detrending
TFP. As shown in Figure 9, TFP was on trend until 1931, but fell progres-
sively thereafter up to 10% below trend in 1934, with no apparent recovery
to trend before the outbreak of the war. An interesting feature of TFP's
behaviour in Belgium is that, though it never recovered its trend level during
8the late 1930s, it got near its trend growth rate from 1936 onwards. This is
evident from a glance at Figure 10, where I have graphed the deterministic
trend of TFP together with its observed value, both standardised to 100 in
1929.
The next step is to assess whether, in a RBC model with exogenous TFP
shocks, the observed behaviour of TFP is su±cient to account for output
movements in Belgium during the Great Depression. This task is undertaken
in the next session.
5 A Baseline RBC Model of the Belgian Great
Depression
5.1 The Model
I assume perfect competition and complete markets. I consider a closed econ-
omy populated by an in¯nitely long-living representative household, which








t [ln(ct) + Áln(1 ¡ lt)]; (2)
under the constraints:






st = ½st¡1 + vt;
xt = °
tx0
0 < ½ < 1;
k0 = given;
s0 = given:
In this model, I have assumed a log-log, time separable utility function.
The parameter ¯ is the household's discount rate. Á is the relative weight
that leisure holds in the utility function and ± is the capital depreciation
rate due to technical obsolescence and physical disruption. I have assumed
that detrended TFP, st, follows an AR(1) process with ½ being its AR(1)
coe±cient, and vt being a zero-mean i.i.d. innovation.






































plus a transversality condition, where ~ x means detrended x.
In such an economy there exist a stationary state growth path for all the
detrended variables.
5.2 Calibration
In order to simulate the model economy, I need to calibrate the parameters







Table 1: Calibration of the parameters
The unit period is the year. The parameters ¯, ± and ® are ¯xed ac-
cordingly, as in Cole and Ohanian (1999). The deterministic growth rate of
the economy is derived as explained in Section 4.1 above. The parameter Á
is calibrated so that the hours worked (l) are 1/3 in the steady state. The
autocorrelation parameter ½ is estimated by regressing the logarithm of the
detrended TFP (i.e. st in the model) as an autoregressive process of order 1.
5.3 Simulation
I assume the model economy to be in a steady state in 1929.5 I fed in
the residuals from regressing the logarithm of detrended TFP as AR(1) to
5Note that the assumption that the economy was in a steady state in 1929 may be
plausible, but it is not a priori justi¯able.
10represent the unexpected shock vt. Figures 11 and 12 present the dynamic
response of the model to the shock.
The model reproduces about 35% of the 1929-1934 output drop. It shows
no signs of recovery after 1934, a feature in full accordance with the data.
The model performs similarly in accounting for consumption. Some 31%
of its 1929-1934 drop is accounted for. From 1934 onwards consumption stays
constant in the model, while it kept on decreasing slightly in the data. As a
result, in 1938 the model accounts for just 28% of the consumption drop.
As for investments, (Figure 12), the model is able to replicate 37% of
their 1929-1934 drop. Things worsen when we consider 1938, with the model
accounting for a mere 14% of the behaviour of investments. This is because
in the model investments recover after 1934, although not to the trend level,
whereas in fact they dropped even more.
As far as hours worked are concerned, the model accounts for a slim
5% of their 1929-1934 drop. In 1938, it accounts for virtually none of their
behaviour.6
5.4 Comments on the Results
According to the exercise described above, TFP shock is not a likely culprit
for explaining the Great Depression in Belgium. First, there is a timing
problem. The detrended data in Figure 9 shows that the economy entered
the Great Depression in 1930, one year later than elsewhere. However, we
can see in the same graph that TFP stayed at trend - and even slightly above
trend - until 1931. It dropped 10% below trend between 1932-1934, to stay
basically constant thereafter.
This translates to a problem of both direction and dimension of the TFP
movements. In my simulation, as a consequence of the TFP behaviour,
output, consumption and investments increase until 1931, to decrease only
later on, a pattern at variance with the data.
A third problem relates to the quantitative side. The simulation's results
6Assuming that the utility function is logarithmic in leisure is tantamount to assuming
that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour supply ¾ is equal to 1, in a CES
speci¯cation such as
U(ct;lt) = lnct + Á





As typical estimates for ¾ range around [0.4, 1] (Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)), such an
assumption is fair to the RBC transmission mechanism, in that, if anything, it overesti-
mates the transmission of the TFP shock. For the sake of completeness, I ran two further
simulations, one with ¾ = 0:4 and the other with ¾ = 1:25. The latter value was chosen to
be the threshold superior limit, as in Merz (1995). The results did not change appreciably.
11are rather poor, with the model only able to account for a small percentage
of the variables' behaviour. This is particularly true as far as labour input is
concerned.
These results suggest two directions for further enquiries. The ¯rst has
to do with the dynamics of investments. A better account of the big drop we
observe in detrended investments would mark an appreciable improvement
over the TFP-driven explanation provided here above. This is particularly
true for the years 1934-38, where the discrepancy between the RBC model
and the data is large.
The second line of research concerns to the behaviour of the labour input.
As TFP was above trend in 1930-31, and given the time-to-build assump-
tion that ¯xes capital in any period t, simple growth accounting suggests
that the behaviour of hours worked is crucial for explaining the onset of the
Depression.
The next two sections are devoted to the task of identifying and modelling
the additional shocks that may lie behind the behaviour of the production
factors.
6 War Expectations and Investments
A striking aspect of the Belgian Great Depression is the dimension of the drop
in detrended investments. A possible explanation of such a drop can be that
sometime in the 1930s agents started to expect a war, and so began to reduce
their capital accumulation. Baudhuin (1961) argues that when Germany re-
militarized the Rhein region in 1936, worries about a possible war started to
circulate. These worries became fully °edged after the annexion of Austria
in 1938.
To see whether war expectations may play a role in explaining investment
dynamics, I simulated the same basic RBC model as in section 5.1, with two
di®erences. First, I assumed zero unexpected TFP shock, in order to isolate
the e®ect of war expectations. Second I imposed an expected exogenous
variation on the rate of capital depreciation ± for the 1940-45 years. The idea
was to translate the anticipated physical destruction of the stock of capital
into a variation of the depreciation rate. I chose two benchmark values for ±:
0.1387, which I have computed in deriving the capital series to account for
the destruction induced by WWI (see Appendix); and a maximum value of
0.5, which means that half of the capital stock is destroyed each year. The
results are shown in ¯gures 13 and 14.
If, in 1929, agents had perfectly foreseen WWII, expecting a degree of
destruction in the stock of capital equal to that experienced in the \Great
12War" (as WWI was known), then the simulated model can account for about
4% of the investment drop in 1938. Output decrease in the model accounts
for 8% of the actual drop in output in 1938. Consumption in the model
stays slightly above the trend, thus not accounting at all for the observed
behaviour of the data. The same is true for hours worked, but for the fact
that this variable shows a slightly decreasing trend, accounting for about
1.5% of the observed slump in actual hours worked in 1938.
If the maximum value ± = 0:5 is chosen for simulation, than the model can
account for a greater proportion of the fall in output, investment and hours
worked in 1938 (37.5%, 74% and 53% respectively). Consumption shows a
counterfactual behaviour, increasing steadily up to 2% above trend.
This exercise shows that in this type of model, war expectations can play
a role in explaining investment dynamics only if the expected disruptions
induced by the war are very large. In the model, this translates into an ex-
pected loss of capital stock that is much bigger than that caused by WWI.
Historically, this seems implausible. People could well have being judging a
war to be increasingly probable, starting from, say, 1936. Yet it is highly
improbable that they were expecting something as ruinous as being four or
¯ve times the scale of WWI. Moreover, if introducing \realistic" war expec-
tations into the model slightly improves on the results based on TFP shocks
for inputs and output, the model results for consumption deteriorate.
All in all, war expectations could be a useful re¯nement of the model,
but they do not seem to be decisive in accounting for the Belgian Great
Depression.
7 Money and Sticky Wages
Results with the benchmark RBC model suggest that an explanation of the
onset of the Great Depression in Belgium must rely mainly on explaining the
behaviour of the labour input. In fact, detrended output began to decrease
in 1930, whereas TFP stayed above the trend until 1931, to start decreasing
only later on.
As real wages were actually increasing up to 1932, the data seem to
suggest that high real wages might be a causal factor in the behaviour of
hours worked. At the same time, nominal wages decreased sharply between
1930 and 1935. This suggests that nominal variables must be taken into
account as well. As price level dropped by 25% in the same period (Figure
7), one possible explanation is that nominal wages staggered, so that prices
decreased more than nominal wages, resulting in increased real wages and,
consequently, in unemployment. This is the position held, for instance, by
13Goossens (1988). It would imply the existence in the data of a downward
sloping Phillips curve, i.e. a negative relation between the rate of variation of
monetary wages (or in°ation) and the unemployment rate. Cassiers (1989b)
argues such a relation is indeed evident for Belgium in the years 1929-1932.
Figure 15 shows a standard Phillips curve for the 1921-1938 period. The
¯gure suggests the existence of an inverse relation between the two variables.7
If, according to this evidence, sticky wages are a plausible propagation
mechanism for the Great Depression in Belgium, we still have to identify
a source for de°ation. According to historians of the period, a major role
in this respect was played by exchange-rate problems in the context of the
gold-standard regime. When, in 1931, the United Kingdom devalued the
pound, so the story goes, the Belgian franc got overvalued, forcing domestic
authorities to de°ate the economy in order to keep market quotas intact for
the export sector. In that context of exchange-rate pegging, money supply
became quasi-endogenous, as it adjusted to the trade balance following pre-
determined rules. This means that the Belgian Central Bank had to move the
discount rate and the monetary base in order to keep the value of the Belgian
franc stable, whenever the trade balance showed a surplus or a de¯cit. In
the event of a unilateral devaluation by an important commercial partner,
the monetary authority had to sterilise the subsequent gold out°ow, and to
de°ate internal prices in order to keep competitiveness on foreign markets.
This direct link between the exchange rate and the money supply in a gold-
standard regime suggests that, in the task of modelling the nominal shock we
want to hold as responsible for the onset of the Belgian Great Depression, we
can use exogenous monetary shocks as a proxy for exchange-rate variations.
The use of this shortcut is supported by the data on nominal money. There
was indeed a monetary contraction starting from 1931 (see Figure 7).
In the light of these arguments, I shall investigate the role of nominal
shocks and sticky wages, in a closed-economy monetary model with contract-
staggering. For all its being but a rough shortcut, this trick will enable me
to produce a ¯rst assessment of the role of sticky wages and nominal shocks,
while retaining a simple model. Moreover the use of a closed-economy model
makes the results directly comparable with those of Section 5.
7The same exercise is repeated in Figure 16, substituting the in°ation rate for the
nominal wage variation rate. Though the scatter again suggests a negative relation between
the two variables, the evidence here is less conclusive than in the previous graph. This
can be interpreted as evidence that monetary wages and CPI followed di®erent patterns,
as the latter could have been more in°uenced by exchange rate troubles.
147.1 The Model
The model of Section 5.1 is modi¯ed to introduce sticky wages and monetary
shocks. I have drawn inspiration from Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000), who
carried out a similar analysis for the United States.
First, I assumed ¯xed labour supply. Second, I postulated a nominal
wage rigidity µ a la Taylor (1980).8 In this setting, workers are divided into
two cohorts, each ¯xing its nominal contract-wage for two years. The contract
scheme is such that, say, cohort one ¯xes its contract in t for periods t and
t + 1, while cohort two ¯xes its contract in t + 1 for periods t + 1 and t + 2.
Then cohort one ¯xes its contract in period t+2 for periods t+2 and t+3,
and so on and so forth. Thus in each period t, there will be two di®erent
contracts, one for the cohort which ¯xed it in period t ¡ 1 and one for the
cohort which ¯xed it in period t. Calling Ât the contract set in period t, the



























The meaning of Equation 7 is that, when negotiating contracts, agents set
them at the geometric mean of the current average wage and the expected fu-
ture average wage, as they know they will not be able to modify the contract
in the next period. The last term on the right hand side makes contracts de-
pendent on general labour market conditions: the contract will be positively
(or negatively) in°uenced by the hours worked being higher (or lower) than
a benchmark level ¹ l, which is the steady-state level, when wages are perfectly
°exible and the labour supply is endogenous.




























which gives the average wage at time t as a function of past and expected
future values of the average wage, and of past, present and future conditions
on the labour market.
8I use Taylor-staggering, as Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) do, because it is the
simplest way to make my point on the possible role of sticky wages, in the presence of
monetary shocks. Nonetheless, I admit that a proper micro-foundation for wage stickiness
would make the model more robust.
15Finally, I assume that agents get utility from holding real money balances.
The timing assumption is that agents get their utility from the real quantity
of money mt = Mt
Pt that remains at the end of period t, after purchasing
consumption goods.9








t [¹ln(ct) + (1 ¡ ¹)ln(mt)]; (9)
under the constraints:









st = ½st¡1 + vt;
xt = °
tx0;
0 < ½ < 1;
³t = ln(Mt) ¡ ln(Mt¡1);
³t ¡ ^ ³ = µt








Here vt and ºt are zero-mean i.i.d. innovations, ¿t is a lump-sum nominal
transfer paid by the government when it issues money, (which in equilibrium
must be equal to the seignorage, mt ¡
mt¡1
(1+¼t), in order to balance the gov-
ernment budget), and ³t is the growth rate of per-capita money stock, which
is assumed to follow an AR(1) process, with ^ ³ and ´ as given parameters.
I assume complete markets, perfect competition in the goods market and
perfect foresight.
Computing the ¯rst order conditions for this problem, and detrending all
the variables, the relevant equations for characterising a solution are
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plus a transversality condition.
The ¯rst two equations are respectively the usual Euler condition and
the resource constraint. Equation 12 is the money demand, which turns out
to be a function of current consumption and the nominal interest rate it.10
Equation 13 is the Fisher equation, stating that nominal interest rates must
be equal to the real interest rate, i.e. the marginal product of capital, plus
the expected in°ation rate.11 Equation 14 gives the rule of formation of
detrended real wages ~ w. It comes from detrending Equation 8. Its role in
the model is to determine hours worked, via the labour demand (Equation
15).
7.2 Calibration
Table 2 shows the parametrisation of the model. The unit period is the year.
The parameters ®, ¯, °, ± and ½ are the same as in Section 5.2.
10A clari¯cation on timing. I de¯ne it as the nominal interest rate paid in period t + 1
to the owners of bonds issued in period t.
11The Fisher equation reported in the text can be formally derived by adding bonds
as a choice variable in the model. Given that bonds play no other role in my model, I











Table 2: Calibration of parameters
The parameter ^ ³ is the average annual growth rate of nominal money
supply. The typical value for this variable is 0.05 (Walsh (2003)). To check
its adequacy for Belgium in the period under examination, I estimated ^ ³ by
running the following AR(1) on the available data for the interwar period:
³t = (1 ¡ ´)^ ³ + ´³t¡1 + ºt:
The result is ^ ³ = 0:047.12
The parameter ´ is estimated by regressing µt as an AR(1) without drift.
The relative weight of consumption and real balances in the utility func-
tion plays no role in the dynamics, so there is no need to calibrate it. I chose
¹ = 0:5.
The trickiest parameter to calibrate is », which gives the elasticity of
nominal contracts to labour market conditions. A high value of » means
a relatively lower degree of wage rigidity: nominal contracts react faster to
hours worked being above or below the steady state value. Vice versa, a low
value of » implies a higher degree of rigidity. Estimates on quarterly U.S.
data by Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) gave » = 0:0037. This value was
chosen by the authors as the one that minimised the average square di®erence
between the observed and simulated real-wage series. Their estimation was
run on the period 1929:4-1933:2. Given that I have yearly data, I chose the
benchmark » to be four times their estimation. Then, I ran a sensitivity
analysis as follows. I compared the growth rates of the series implied by the
model with that of the data for threshold values of ». These values were
chosen to be two times, four times, a quarter and a eighth the benchmark
12Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) ran a similar regression on quarterly U.S. data, limited
to the period 1922:2-1928:4. Adjusted on a yearly basis, their estimations gave a value of
0.02 for ^ ³.
18value. The model was simulated after feeding in the series of estimated ºt.
This is the series of residuals from regressing µt, (the deviation of the growth
rate of nominal money supply from its long-run average value), as an AR(1).
It stands for unexpected monetary shock, and it is plotted in Figure 17.
Productivity shocks were set to zero.13
Figure 18 shows the results of this sensitivity exercise. It shows that the
choice of » (xi) within the range of values considered does not a®ect the results
in any important way. The ¯gure also shows that my benchmark value of
0.0148 is a conservative one, with respect to the observed wage rigidity. This
guarantees that, if anything, the approximation will run against the objective
of this model, which is to account for the Great Depression in Belgium by
means of wage rigidities and monetary shocks.
7.3 Simulation
The model economy is assumed to be in steady state in 1929. The monetary
shock series were fed in as explained above, and TFP shocks were set to
zero. Figures 19, 20 and 21 show the dynamic response of the model to the
unexpected monetary shock, and compare it with the dynamics of the data.
The model reproduces about 115% of the 1929-1934 drop in output (Fig-
ure 19). Simulated output returns nearly to trend in 1935-36, to witness a
10% further drop below the trend level in 1937. However, in the detrended
data output stagnated around 20% below trend in 1935-1937.
The model predicts slightly more than 100% of the 1929-1934 drop in
consumption. As far the 1935-1937 period is concerned, the model di®ers
from the data in much the same way as output does.
The drop in investments is overestimated by the model, which accounts
for about 110% of the actual drop between 1929 and 1934 (Figure 20). Again,
the model predicts a recovery after 1935 which is not in the data.
The same pattern is evident as far as hours worked is concerned. At the
trough of the depression, the model's hours are 35% below trend, whereas in
the data they were \only" 21% below trend. The model shows a recovery in
1935-1936 which is not in the data. However, it matches the 1937 value.
Figure 21 show that the model ¯ts the behaviour of real cash balances
reasonably well, but it has some problems as far as the in°ation rate is
concerned. In particular, the model dramatically overestimates the 1935
13I shut down productivity shocks because, as the data suggest that nominal shocks
might have been important, I wanted to isolate the e®ect of purely nominal shocks ¯rst,
without confusing them with other sources of °uctuations. Section 7.6 takes productivity
shocks into account, and shows that nominal shocks were indeed crucial.
19value of in°tion.14
7.4 Comments on the Results
This exercise shows that monetary shocks with nominal sticky wages provides
a step in the right direction for an explanation of the slump in the early 1930s.
This is in line with the suggestions put forward by historians.
The improvement on the simpler RBC model of Section 5 is apprecia-
ble, especially as concerns the behaviour of investments and hours worked.
However, there are still three respects in which the model is not satisfac-
tory. First, the model predicts an initial increase of detrended output in
1930, which is at variance with the data. Second, it overestimates output
and investment dynamics in 1929-1934, meaning that either the propagation
mechanism is too strong, or the impulse mechanism was mismeasured, i.e.
the monetary shock that was fed in a was too strong.
The third unsatisfactory aspect of the model is that it fails to explain
the 1935-1937 absence of recovery. A ¯rst interpretation of this ¯nding is
that the monetary expansion due to the 1935 devaluation was mismeasured.
The sudden upsurge in 1935 estimated ºt in Figure 17 and the abnormal
model in°ation dynamics in Figure 21, both suggest this might be the case.
Another possible interpretation is that the model assumes a symmetric wage
staggering. That is, wages are assumed to be be as sticky downwards as
they are upwards. This implies that the big monetary expansion led by the
devaluation of 1935 causes in°ation to increase in the model, thereby dragging
real wages downwards. In fact, what we observe in the data (Figure 18) is
almost the contrary: after 1935 detrended real wages suddenly increased
further above the trend.
7.5 Asymmetric Wage Rigidity
As suggested above, a possible interpretation of the inability of the sticky-
wages model to account for the 1935-1937 absence of recovery is that we may
need a model in which nominal wage rigidity is asymmetric, with wages being
rigid downwards, but °exible upwards. This interpretation may ¯nd support
14For the sake of comparison, the price levels in Figure 21 are built upon the in°ation




(1 + ¼t+n¡j);for n = [1;2;:::];
where Pt = 100 and t = 1929.
20from historical evidence suggesting that in 1936 a wave of strikes spreading
from France shook the country, with an appreciable, if not enduring, e®ect
on increasing nominal wages (Baudhuin (1961)).
To verify such a hypothesis, I carried out the following experiment. The
1929-1937 period was split into two subperiods. In the ¯rst, covering the
years 1929-1934, I used the same model as in the previous section, with Taylor
wage-staggering and monetary shocks. In the second period, covering 1935-
1937, I assumed a competitive labour market, with endogenous labour supply
and monetary shocks. The leisure choice appears in the utility function in
log-additive terms. The results of a model with asymmetric wage rigidity
(amr) are shown in ¯gures 22, 23, 24 and 25.
This exercise does not con¯rm the hypothesis that asymmetric wage rigid-
ity could have played a role. The dynamics of the model with competitive
wages since 1935 are only slightly less accentuated than that with Taylor
staggering. The reason for the qualitative behaviour of the model economy
is that by construction the model economy is always on a saddle-path con-
verging to the steady state. This means that, if the economy is far below the
steady state, mechanisms exist for convergence to be achieved in the absence
of shocks. In particular, the starting point in 1934 was characterized by cap-
ital, output and consumption below, and real wages above, the steady state.
This means that investments must \overshoot" to build up new capital stock,
while workers will substitute relatively expensive leisure for consumption.15
In conclusion, it seems that an additional negative shock is required to
account for the absence of recovery in 1935-37.
7.6 TFP Shocks and Sticky Wages
This section serves the purpose of showing how the monetary model with
sticky wages would fare, were TFP shocks the only impulse mechanism at
work during the Belgian Great Depression. The contribution of this ex-
ercise is to examine whether the Great Depression was really a monetary
phenomenon, or whether, if nominal wage stickiness is assumed, TFP shocks
and monetary shocks have comparable data-mimicking abilities.
15Simulations with the same model and zero monetary shocks produce identical results,
meaning that, in the model economy with competitive wages, positive nominal shocks play
no role in the recovery. On the contrary, if the monetary shock is shut down for the same
period in the Taylor scenario, the recovery is much smoother. The reason is that it takes
time for wages to adjust, while nominal disturbances still have a (tiny) autoregressive
component. As expected, if we assume that the economy was in steady state in 1934, then
the big positive monetary shock of 1935 has large real e®ects in the model with Taylor
staggering.
21In order to carry out this exercise, monetary shocks were set to zero and
the TFP shocks were fed in as in Section 5. The results are shown in Figures
26, 27 and 28.
As can be easily seen from the graphs, TFP shocks perform worse than
monetary shocks in accounting for the onset of the Great Depression. In-
deed, the presence of Taylor staggering in nominal wages does not produce
appreciable improvements on the transmission mechanism of TFP shocks,
with respect to the baseline model of Section 5. Like that model, TFP shocks
performs better than the monetary model in accounting for the 1935-37 data.
As expected, the model produces counterfactual in°ation dynamics, and a
poorer ¯t to the real cash balances. However, such a feature is meaningless,
as these variables are strictly dependent on the behaviour of the money sup-
ply. Given that the growth rate of money supply ³ is constrained to be equal
to ^ ³ by setting µ = 0, it is no surprise that the ¯t is worsened.
My conclusion from this exercise is that wage stickiness may be an im-
portant transmission mechanism in a model with monetary shocks, but plays
no appreciable role in one with TFP shocks.
8 A Small Open Economy RBC Model
So far, the argument has run within a closed-economy set up.
For all its being in line with the literature on RBC models of the Great De-
pression, such a perspective still contrasts with the common wisdom among
historians, who maintain that the Belgian Great Depression is better under-
stood once the small open economy dimension is taken into account (Cassiers
(1989a)). A robustness check seems therefore in order. This section illus-
trates how the results are likely to be modi¯ed once we extend the analysis
to encompass the open-economy dimension. As a complete analysis of the
open-economy scenario falls beyond the limits of the present work, I shall
limit myself to a very basic RBC model, ignoring the complications coming
from money and price stickiness, and from exchange rates as well.
8.1 The Model
The model draws on Mendoza (1991), and is a modi¯ed version of that of
Section 5. It is assumed that the economy can exchange assets with the rest of
the world. These assets pay a constant real interest rate r¤. The small-open-
economy assumption implies that the domestic economy cannot in°uence
the value of r¤. Therefore, in a deterministic set-up a no-arbitrage condition
must exist: ex ante, the domestic real interest rate, which is equal to the
22marginal product of capital, ought in turn to be equal to r¤. The obvious
implication is that, if an ex ante discrepancy between r and r¤ is observed,
capital and hours worked have to adjust until the no-arbitrage condition is
again satis¯ed. A crucial assumption is that foreigners cannot own domestic
physical capital. Labour is immobile, and markets are incomplete, in the
sense that no contracts contingent on the realisation of the shocks exist. Of
course, the presence of lending and borrowing on the world market provides
agents with some insurance.
Let bt be the value of per capita net foreign assets held by the represen-
tative household at the end of period t ¡ 1. Following Obstfeld and Rogo®
(1996), I de¯ne the current account balance in period t, CAt, as
CAt ´ bt+1 ¡ bt:
Therefore, in this model the current account is the variation of the net claims
of a country over the rest of the world.16
The presence of assets adds a variable to the optimisation problem faced
by our representative household: how many assets to hold at the end of the
period, given its initial endowment.








t [ln(ct) + Áln(1 ¡ lt)]; (16)
under the constraints:







st = ½st¡1 + vt;
16This concept corresponds to the traditional concept of current account balance as net
exports. To see that, decompose the budget constraint
ct + kt+1 + bt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)kt + yt + (1 + r¤)bt
into
kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)kt + it
it = yt ¡ ct + r¤bt ¡ CAt:
As the ¯rst three terms on the right-hand side corresponds to national savings, and re-
membering from national accounts that I ¡S = M ¡X, where M stands for imports and








I assume perfect foresight. Computing the ¯rst order conditions of this
problem, and detrending all the variable, the relevant equations for charac-
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plus transversality conditions. What is new here, with respect to the previous
model, is the no-arbitrage condition in Equation 18, whereas Equations 17
and 19 give the open-economy version of the Euler equation and the budget
constraint respectively.
As is well known in the literature, the steady state of this class of open-
economy models turns out to be consistent with any initial level of net assets
(Correia, Neves, and Rebelo (1995), Kim and Kose (2003)). This multiple-
equilibria feature introduces a stationarity problem in the model: at steady
state, a country with higher net assets holdings will be able to a®ord higher
trade de¯cits, and therefore higher consumption levels. As a consequence,
any shock, even if trend-stationary, will have permanent e®ects on assets and
therefore on consumption. This introduces a random-walk component in the
model.
Many ways exist to solve this problem (Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003)).
I chose to impose a risk premium on the real interest rate paid or received
by the domestic economy. The idea is that the lower the net asset holding of
the country, or, when b is negative, the higher its foreign debt, the higher the
24interest rate it has to pay to borrow more will be. So, in the model above,
we can substitute r¤ with
rt = r
¤ + Ã(e
¡bt ¡ 1): (21)
This trick stationarises the model, as the steady state level of b is now
determined by the Euler equation, and turns out to be a function of r¤ and
Ã only.
8.2 Calibration and Simulation
The model is calibrated as in Section 5. The parameter Ã is calibrated so
that the model matches the standard deviation of CA
y during the 1930s. The
steady-state world interest rate is given at r¤ =
°
¯ ¡1. I assume the economy
to be in steady state in 1929. In the model, the steady-state value of current
account is assumed to be 0, as are the initial and steady-state values of net
foreign assets. I feed in TFP shocks as in Section 5.17 The results are shown










Table 3: Calibration of parameters
As is evident from the graphs, no appreciable improvements on the closed-
economy RBC model of Section 5 are observed. The two models hold the
same explanatory power for output, consumption and labour dynamics. The
open-economy model fares slightly better in accounting for the investment
drop, at the price of having too volatile investment behaviour after 1934.
Such a feature is in full accordance with standard results in the literature:
small-open-economy RBC models tends to accentuate investment volatility
17It is worth noticing that in an open-economy model context, TFP shocks encompass
terms of trade variations, as aptly argued by Mendoza (1991).
25(Mendoza (1991)).18
As to the behaviour of the current account, the model performs rather
poorly. It predicts countercyclical behaviour of the current account over
output, which is evidently at variance with the data. As this may be due to
the assumption of a balanced steady-state current account, it can be useful
to compare trends instead of levels. So, in Figure 32, I have included an
additional line, the shifted data line, normalised so that the value of the
current account over output is zero in 1929. In comparing it with the model
line, we see that both the direction and the amplitude of the variations of
the current account ratio are at variance with the model's results.
This simple exercise shows that, while elaborating on this oversimpli¯ed
RBC open-economy model may yield interesting new results, the analysis
presented in this paper is robust enough to the closed-economy hypothesis.
8.3 Extension: Shocks on r¤
We may speculate whether adding an additional source of °uctuations, one
more directly linked to the international dimension than TFP, would improve
on the results obtained so far. To explore this conjecture, I ran the same
simulation as above, but assumed that the world interest rate, r¤, was subject






¡ 1 + ²t:
The shock series is obtained as the di®erence between the \theoretical"
r¤ used in the previous simulation and the ex post real interest rate observed
for Belgium in the data. The shock ²t is assumed to be 0 in the steady state.
The results of this exercise improve on the previous results for the be-
haviour of output and labour input, particularly as concerns the years 1933-34
(see Figures 33, 34 and 35). However, the price of such an improvement is
an abnormal volatility of investments and the current account, which are at
variance with the data. This casts a shadow over the overall reliability of the
results, and leads me to stick to my previous conclusion that, prima facie at
least, the closed-economy analysis presented in this paper is relatively robust.
18The typical model encompasses adjustment costs on capital, which I refrain from
including for the sake of comparability with the previous models. Intuitively, the presence
of adjustment costs on capital will kill the excess volatility shown by the model at the end
of the decade. At the same time, it is likely to worsen the predictive capacity of the model
for the initial drop.
269 Conclusions
This paper gives partial support to the accepted wisdom among histori-
ans, that the Great Depression in Belgium was essentially a monetary phe-
nomenon, due to an external shock and propagated via sticky nominal wages.
Results show that a DSGE model with nominal wage staggering µ a la Tay-
lor and monetary shocks gives a reliable way of modelling the onset of Great
Depression in Belgium. On the other hand, the contribution of TFP shocks
appears to be slim, no matter whether cast in a perfect-competition, °exible-
price model or in a sticky-wage environment. Introducing war expectations
into the baseline RBC model produces little improvement on the results.
None of the models considered in this paper is able to account for the
absence of recovery after the 1935 devaluation. Further research is therefore
necessary to achieve a better understanding of the second half of the 1930s
in Belgium.
As explained in the text, I used monetary shocks as a shortcut for ex-
change rates problems. If such a perspective is arguably a good ¯rst approx-
imation, a more complete analysis of the Belgian Great Depression should go
beyond the shortcut, and face the open-economy issues. Data show that Bel-
gian imports and exports comprised as much as 30% of income in the interwar
period. We know from historians that Belgian industries typically concen-
trated on the production of highly-standardised semi-manufactured goods for
foreign markets (Hogg (1986), Mommen (1994)). Hence, it is safe to say that
Belgium showed all the characteristics of the typical small open economy.
Moreover, Belgium had an important bilateral relationship with the United
Kingdom. These two characteristics make the Belgian case suitable for anal-
ysis within two di®erent frameworks in international macroeconomics. One
is the small-open-economy version of the standard RBC model. Originally
advanced by Mendoza (1991) in a pure RBC perspective, such a framework
has recently been enriched by Galµ ³ and Monacelli (2005) in a New Keynesian
fashion, merging money, nominal frictions and monopolistic competition with
the small-open-economy RBC model. In Section 8, I took a ¯rst step in this
direction, by considering a baseline open-economy version of the standard
RBC model. The results were not satisfactory, as no new information on the
Belgian Great Depression was gained. This was possibly due to the assumed
oversimpli¯ed theoretical structure, that excluded monetary phenomena.
Alternatively, we can think of using a two-country framework for mod-
elling Belgium and the United Kingdom in the 1930s. This class of models
was pioneered in modern macroeconomics by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
(1992) within a pure RBC set-up. It was then extended to a New Keyne-
sian framework by Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995), and nowadays many versions
27exist.19 Such extensions are left for future research.
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Appendix: Data
Real Interest Rate
Nominal interest rates are monthly nominal returns on Belgian irredeemable
bonds, expressed on a yearly basis (iy). Real interest rates are computed in
the following way. Using the monthly retail price index, a monthly rate of
in°ation is computed. Then, a monthly-based interest rate im is calculated
according to the simple no-arbitrage rule
(1 + iy) = (1 + im)
12: (22)
Next, I worked out a series for the monthly-based real interest rate (rm),
assuming a static version of the Fisher equation,
it = rt + Et¡1¼t; (23)
31with Et¡1¼t = ¼t. Finally, I used Equation 22 to obtain a yearly-based
monthly series for the real interest rate (ry).
The series so obtained covers the period 1920:1-1940:2. It shows high
volatility, and seasonal components. In order to smooth the series and get
rid of seasonality, I computed a new series ~ ry as a 12-periods moving average
of ry. The new series covers the 1921:1-1940:2 subperiod, and is the one
graphed in Figure 4.
Unemployment Rate
Monthly unemployment rates are computed in the following way. Using data
from the Banque Nationale de Belgique on monthly total working days lost
per 1000 insured and per week, I divided each number by 10, to give the
monthly working days lost because of unemployment per 100 insured and
per week. To get a percentage referring to individuals rather than weeks,
I divided the result by 6, the number of working days in a week. This
gives a rough measure of unemployment for several reasons. First, according
to the Banque Nationale de Belgique, on December 31st, 1930, the total
number of employed was 1,850,272, whereas that of insured workers was just
695,045. Second, my procedure measures unemployment implicitly as if all
the unemployed were without work for the whole month long, which was, of
course, not always the case.
Money
Hogg (1986) provides series on the monetary base, money multiplier and the
aggregate M1. While the series for the monetary base is complete, those
for the money multiplier and the aggregate M1 lack the 1934 value. I have
reconstructed this value as follows. I took the 1934 money multiplier to be
the average of the 1933 and the 1935 values. Then I multiplied this multiplier
by the 1934 monetary base, to get the 1934 value for M1.
Labour
I do not have a complete series of labour and employment data for the inter-
war years. Maddison (1995) reports data on total employment, labour force,
annual hours worked per worker, and total hours worked for the years 1913,
1929, 1938, 1950, 1960, 1973, 1987. Unemployment rates from 1921 to 1938
and from 1950 to 1989 are also reported. I used these data to build an arti-
¯cial series of total employment in the following way. Taking the two values
32of the labour force in 1913 and 1929, I computed a constant compounded
rate of growth of the labour force g
lf
(13;29) using the formula














(73;87). Then, I assumed that the labour force lf evolved
at a constant pace in each subperiod. Thus, for instance, the labour force in
1914 will be
lf14 = lf13(1 + g
lf
(13;29)): (25)
This arti¯cial series of the labour force is then used to obtain a total
employment series (L), the variable we are interested in, by using the unem-
ployment rate (u). This is done using this standard formula
L = (1 ¡ u)lf; (26)
which uses the fact that the employment and unemployment rates are de¯ned
as the ratios of the number of employed and unemployed, respectively, over
the labour force, and are therefore complements to 1.
As is clear from this account, the information about the numbers of em-
ployed is basically driven by the unemployment rate.
In order to have an idea of the bias introduced by this procedure, I com-
pared the arti¯cial series with the data provided by the Belgian Planning
Bureau for the period 1953-1988.20 Results showed similar behaviour for
the two series. The arti¯cial series tends to ¯t the actual one in the mid-
1960s and in the late 1980s, and to underestimate total employment in the
remaining years.
After this robustness check, I rerun the computations, substituting the
unemployment rate taken from Goossens, Peeters, and Pepermans (1988), for
that used by Maddison. This was done because Maddison's numbers seem
to underestimate the unemployment rate. Figure 36 compares the data from
di®erent sources. The underestimation appears especially evident during the
1930s.
To get hours worked, I took the employment series, multiplied it ¯rst
by 48, (the maximum legal working hours per week), and then by 50, (the
numbers of per year working weeks in 1929, according to Maddison (1995)).
As for the population of working age, the available data only cover the
years 1920, 1930, 1935, 1939. I interpolated such data to obtain a series (N).
20I thank David de la Croix for providing these data.
33Capital
To the best of my knowledge there exists no complete capital series for the
Belgian economy in the interwar period. This means that I had to rely on
an estimation. The standard procedure is to estimate capital by using the
perpetual-inventory method, that is the relation
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + It: (27)
A problem with this method is how to obtain a reliable estimate of the initial
value K0. My choice was to deduce K0 from neoclassical growth theory. From
the law of motion of capital, we know that
(1 + n)Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + It; (28)
where n stands for the growth rate of population, which we assume to be
constant in the long run. Calling g the constant growth rate of capital, and
solving Equation 28 for Kt we get
Kt =
It
n + g + ±
: (29)
Given that neoclassical theory tells us that, along the balanced growth
path, the growth rate of capital is the same as the growth rate of output, I
assumed g to be the constant growth rate of output estimated in Section 4.1.
Then I took data on investments from van Meerten (2003), which has a long
(1900-1960) series expressed in 1936-38 Belgian francs, (which is therefore
comparable with the other data used in this study). I assumed ± = 0:1 and
then applied Equation 29 to get an estimate of capital in 1900. In doing that,
I implicitly assumed that the economy was in a steady state in 1900. From
this initial value, I computed a capital series by means of Equation 27.
To take into account the e®ect of the First World War, I adopted the
following procedure. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, Belgium lost
between 16 and 20% of its wealth during the war. I took this to mean that
the capital stock in 1919 was 20% less than it would have there been had
been no war. Then I solved the following equation for ±:
K19 = K13(1¡±)6+I13(1¡±)5+I14(1¡±)4+I15(1¡±)3+I16(1¡±)2+I17(1¡±)+I18:
In this way I considered physical destruction brought about by the war as
an exogenous increase in the constant depreciation rate of capital. Figure 37
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Figure 4: Real interest rate and unemployment rate. Source: My elaboration
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Monthly rate of inflation Retail price index
Figure 6: Monthly retail price index and in°ation. Source: Banque Nationale























Figure 7: Nominal money supply and retail price index . Sources: Banque
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Actual TFP Trend TFP
Figure 10: TFP: deterministic trend versus actual values. Source: My elab-
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1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Model - TFP Data Model - Exp War Model - Exp War delta WWI
Figure 13: Simulation: RBC model with unexpected TFP shocks, actual
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1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Model - TFP Data Model - Exp War Model - Exp War delta WWI
Figure 14: Simulation: RBC model with unexpected TFP shocks, actual
economy and RBC model with war anticipation
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Figure 15: Phillips curve, Belgium 1921-1939. Source: Goossens, Peeters,
and Pepermans (1988)
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Figure 16: In°ation-unemployment trade-o®, Belgium 1921-1938. Sources:
Banque Nationale de Belgique (1943a), Banque Nationale de Belgique
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1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
Model - money Data Model - awr
Figure 22: Simulation: model with monetary shocks, sticky wages until 1934
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Model - money Data Model - awr
Figure 23: Simulation: model with monetary shocks, sticky wages until 1934
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Model - money Data Model - awr
Figure 24: Simulation: model with monetary shocks, sticky wages until 1934
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Model - money Data Model - awr
Figure 25: Simulation: model with monetary shocks, sticky wages until 1934
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Model - Money Data Model - TFP
Figure 26: Simulation: model with sticky wages and monetary shocks, actual
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Model - Money Data Model - TFP
Figure 27: Simulation: model with sticky wages and monetary shocks, actual
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Model - Money Data Model - TFP
Figure 28: Simulation: model with sticky wages and monetary shocks, actual
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Figure 29: Simulation: model with sticky wages and monetary shocks, actual
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Figure 30: Simulation: RBC open-economy and closed-economy models ver-
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Figure 31: Simulation: RBC open-economy and closed-economy models ver-
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Figure 32: Simulation: RBC open-economy and closed-economy models ver-
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Open-Economy Data Closed-Economy Open-Economy + r-shock
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Open-Economy Data Closed-Economy Open-Economy + r-shock
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Open-Economy Data Data 1929=0 Open-Economy + r-shock
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Figure 36: Unemployment rate: a comparison of di®erent estimates. Sources:
u Mad, Maddison (1995); u comp, yearly geometric mean of the monthly rate
























































Figure 37: Capital before and after correcting for WWI. Source: My elabo-
ration on van Meerten (2003)
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